System Concepts, Inc. v. Shirley M. Dixon : Appellant\u27s Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1982
System Concepts, Inc. v. Shirley M. Dixon :
Appellant's Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
John Parsons; Thomas N. Crowther; Cynthia J. Crass; Parsons & Crowther; Attorneys for Appellant;
Ellen Maycock; Kruze, Landa, Zimmerman & Maycock; Attorneys for Respondent;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, No. 18034 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2640
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
SYSTEM CONCEPTS, INC., a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
) 
Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SHIRLEY M. DIXON, an individual, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
--~--~~~~~---------~----~--> 
Civil No. 18034 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE DAVID B. DEE 
Ellen Maycock, Esq. 
KRUSE, LANDA, ZIMMERMAN 
& MAYCOCK 
Attorneys for Respondent 
620 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
PRESIDING 
John Parsons, Esq. 
Thomas N. Crowther, Esq. 
Cynthia J. Crass, Esq. 
PARSONS & CROWTHER 
455 South Third East, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FILED 
l\UG - 2 1982 
.................................... .,,,, ................. ... 
Cler~ Supreme Court, Uta,., 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
SYSTEM CONCEPTS, INC., a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
) 
Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SHIRLEY M. DIXON, an individual, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
~~~~--~----~--~--~---~~~> 
Civil No. 18034 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE DAVID B. DEE 
Ellen Maycock, Esq. 
KRUSE, LANDA, ZIMMERMAN 
& MAYCOCK 
Attorneys for Respondent 
620 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
PRESIDING 
John Parsons, Esq. 
Thomas N. Crowther, Esq. 
Cynthia J. Crass, Esq. 
PARSONS & CROWTHER 
455 South Third East, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ••.•..•.•.•••••••••••••.•.•.••••.•.•. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT HAS MET ITS BURDEN FOR THE 
Page 
1 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SOUGHT............ 2 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
THE RECORD EVIDENCE DO NOT SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OR ORDER 4 
III. THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT IN THIS ACTION IS 
PROPERLY ENFORCEABLE BY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
CONCLUSION •••.•••••••••••.•.•••.••••.•.•..•...••....••• 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE •.•••••••...••••.•.••.•.•.•.••.•. 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Cases 
Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 237 P.2d 823 
(1951) ................................................ . 
Shaw v. Jeppson, 121 Utah 155, 239 P.2d 745 (1952) ••.•• 
Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 75.~ •..•••...••.•.••••..• 
Other Authorities 
Restatement 2d Agency §§395, 396 (1958) .•.•••••••.••••• 
Vol. 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§2948 (1973} .......................................... . 
5 
7 
8 
5 
5 
1 
6 
2 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SYSTEM CONCEPTS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
SHIRLEY M. DIXON, an individual, 
Respondent. 
Civil No. 18034 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 75, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and in accordance therewith, Appellant hereby responds to 
Respondent's Brief on file herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant takes issue with Respondent's strong implication 
that there was no consideration for Respondent's execution of the 
proprietary information and restrictive employment agreement 
("Agreement") involved here. Respondent did receive a promotion and 
raise shortly after she executed the Agreement (Transcript at 42-43, 
Exh. 12) and received the Agreement's stated consideration of con-
tinued employment with Appellant until she voluntarily terminated 
such employment. Significantly, the trial court specifically found 
adequate compensation and consideration for Respondent's execution 
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of the Agreement {Transcript at 43-44). 
Appellant also contends, contrary to Respondent, that 
Respondent, during her employment, was involved in the design and 
development of Appellant's products. Respondent testified that she 
made design and operation suggestions in response to a specific 
request by Appellant. Respondent's suggestions were solicited 
because of her knowledge of customer needs and desires (Transcript 
at 39-40, 15-18 Exh. 10). 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT HAS MET ITS BURDEN FOR THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
SOUGHT. 
At pages three and four of her Brief, Respondent cites 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §2948 to support her 
contention that Appellant is not entitled to a preliminary injunc-
tion because Appellant has not clearly carried the burden of per-
suasion and has not met the primary requirement for a preliminary 
injunction, that being evidence of irreparable injury. 
Respondent's quote from Vol. 11 Wright and Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure §2948 is followed by an admonition that 
[a]lthough these short hand formulations ['movant, by a clear 
showing carries the burden of persuasion'] express the courts' 
general reluctance to impose an interim restraint on Defendant 
before the parties' rights have been adjudicated, they do not 
take the place of a sound evaluation of the factors to granting 
relief under Rule 65(a). l9_. at 429-30. 
Wright and Miller also suggest that the most important prerequisite 
for granting a preliminary injunction "is a demonstration that if it 
is not granted the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm 
before a decision on the merits can be rendered." Id. at 431 
{emphasis added). Thus, merely "[a] presently existing actual 
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threat must be shown," not actual or certain injury. Id. at 437. 
Appellant clearly has carried its burden in showing likely 
and actual threatened harm to Appellant. There is substantial evi-
dence in Respondent's testimony and Brief that Respondent was an 
integral part of Appellant's marketing and sales program, was privy 
to confidential, proprietary information (Transcript at 15-18, 
22-23, 25-28, 38, 40, 44) and had among her duties to Appellant com-
piling customer lists, assisting in promotion, and coordinating 
sales leads (Respondent's Brief at 2). As aforestated, Respondent 
had input into Appellant's designs for its products. There is 
overwhelming evidence of the goodwill Appellant built around 
Respondent during her employment (Transcript at 25-28, 46, Exh. 13). 
There is no question that Respondent is now employed by 
MetroData as its national sales manager which employment will con-
tinue during the pending of this action. Respondent now has the 
incentive and ability to and has in fact misappropriated the good 
will and information she obtained during her employment with 
Appellant for use by a direct competitor of Appellant (Transcript 
at 29, 44-45). Respondent knows Appellant's actual and potential 
customers, their needs and desires and how Appellant.' s products 
respond to those needs and desires. Respondent knows Appellant's 
marketing strategy and in fact was an integral part of that 
marketing strategy because of the goodwill Appellant built for her 
in the cable television industry. 
Respondent's likely, threatened and actual misappropriation 
of Appellant's confidential, proprietary information and goodwill 
has and will cause irreparable injury to Appellant; such likely, 
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threatened and actual injury will impair the court's ability to 
grant an effective remedy absent injunction. Wright ana Miller, 
supra at 434. "Injury to ••• goodwill is not measurable in mone-
tary terms, and so often is viewed as irreparable." Id. at 439. 
Respondent must, therefore, be enjoined. The fact that injury may 
have already occurred only supports restraining its continuance. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE RECORD EVIDENCE DO 
NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OR ORDER. 
Respondent contends that the lower court's findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are supported by the evidence. Appellant 
contends that the lower court's conclusions of law have no support 
in its findings or the evidence. The fact that Appellant has 
approved the lower court's conclusions of law as to form cannot be 
construed as approval as to substance; neither does Appellant's 
honoring the time constraints of the trial court consitute waiver. 
Appellant contends there is no evidentiary basis to support 
the trial court conclusions that i) "[i]ssuance of a preliminary 
injunction •.. would prohibit Defendant Dixon from any employment 
within the industry in which she is trained", that ii) "great 
hardship for Defendant Dixon would be created", that iii) "[t]he 
contract is a contract of adhesion," that iv) "enforcement of it 
[contract] would create substantial hardship for Defendant Dixon," 
that v) "plaintiff is not entitled to the equitable remedy of a 
preliminary injunctio~," and that vi) "[p]laintiff has failed to 
meet the standards of Rule 65A . . . governing issuance of a preli-
mary injunction." Such far-reaching conclusions are not supported 
by the findings from the record evidence of Appellant's corporate 
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status, location and business; Respondent's employment by Appellant; 
the language of Respondent's Agreement with Appellant; MetroData's 
business; and Respondent's employment by MetroData. 
Respondent's argument at page five of her Brief that the 
lower court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are supported 
by the evidence is replete with conclusory phrases such as "It is 
obvious", "As the conclusions indicate", "there is sufficient 
evidence", but Respondent does not cite the findings or record evi-
dence which supposedly support the lower court's conclusions of law. 
Respondent's argument merely shows that the lower court made conclu-
sions of law supporting Respondent's position; it does not show the 
evidentiary basis for such conclusions of law because there is no 
such evidentiary basis. 
III. THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT IN THIS ACTION IS PROPERLY ENFORCEABLE 
BY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. 
Respondent contends that the law cited by Appellant does 
not support the grant of a preliminary injunction to enforce 
Respondent's Agreement. Respondent contends that Allen Y..:_ ~Park 
Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 237 P.2d 823 (1951) is distinguishable and 
Shaw .::L!_ Jeppson, 121 Utah 155, 239 P.2d 745 {1952) does not 
appropriately deal with the issue involved here. 
The Allen case did res~lt in a declaratory judgment that a 
covenant not to compete meeting its criteria is enforceable 
according to its terms. In Allen, enforcement of the covenant 
required Plaintiff to honor the restrictions on his future 
employment to which he had previously agreed. This is exactly the 
relief sought by Appellant against Respondent here, i.e. that she 
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honor her Agreement which provides for injunctive relief and 
restricts her future employment. 
Also, Plaintiff Allen, like Respondent in this case, did 
make his agreement not to compete sometime after he was hired, 
237 P.2d at 824: Plaintiff Allen, like Respondent here, did 
not negotiate the covenant not to compete, although he did negotiate 
other terms of his employment. .!£. Furthermore, record evidence 
shows that the area and duration of the covenant is necessary in 
order to protect Appellant's nationwide marketing area and is thus 
reasonable. 
Admittedly the Shaw appellate opinion did not center on 
the issue of enforceability of a restictive covenant by injunction 
because such issue had already been determined in favor of enfor-
ceability and was not raised on appeal. Justice Wolfe, however, in 
his concurrence did cite Allen to support his view that restrictive 
covenants are enforceable in accordance with their terms, including 
enforcement by the injunctive remedy granted in Shaw. 239 P.2d at 
748-49. 
Furthermore, 
Restatement 2d Agency 
Appellant 
§§ 395, 
stands by its citation of 
396 (1958) because the likely, 
threatened and actual use by Respondent Dixon of confidential and 
proper ietary information admittedly acquired by her during her 
employment with Appellant is an important aspect of this case. 
Such is a major factor of the irreparable injury caused and 
to be caused Appellant which gives the Appellant the right to the 
relief it seeks. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent's Agreement meets the criteria of Allen and is 
thus enforceable according to its terms, including enforcement by 
injunction as was done in Shaw. 
The trial court's conclusions of law, pursuant to which it 
denied Appellant's motion for a preliminary injunction, have no sup-
port in the trial court's findings of fact gleaned from the record 
evidence presented; therefore the trial court abused its discretion 
in using such erroneous conclusions to support its Order. 
Appellant has shown, to the extent possible, ~he irre-
parable injury caused Appellant by Respondent's going to work for 
MetroData and the irreparable injury to be caused Appellant if 
Respondent is allowed to continue misappropriating Appellant's good-
will and proprietary information through continued employment with 
Metrooata. Hardship to Respondent can be mollified by security; 
hardship to Appellant cannot. Therefore, the lower court should be 
reversed and directed to enter a preliminary injunction as 
requested by Appellant. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of August, 1982. 
PARSONS & CROWTHER 
By~a~ 
~ons 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Two copies of the foregoing Brief were mailed, postage pre-
paid, to Ellen Maycock, Kruse, Landa, Zimmerman & Maycock, 
Attorneys for Respondent, 620 Kearns Building, 136 South Main, Salt 
Lake City, Utah this 2nd day of August, 1982. 
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